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Empirical studies of the causes or consequences of civil war often use measures that
do not correspond to theory and results are sensitive to small changes in the coding
of civil wars. Civil war is an instance of “sovereignty rupture” and is inherently a
polity-level phenomenon, but that understanding of civil war is not reflected in data
in which civil war is coded as a dyadic conflict—the state fighting a domestic chal-
lenger. We demonstrate the consequences of conceptual ambiguity about which
conflicts to code as civil war and when to code the start and end of a civil war. Using
a new data set of civil wars from 1945 to 2016 that is consistent with the concept of
sovereignty rupture, we replicate several studies and find that their results are often
overturned or weakened when we use our data. We advocate for greater delib-
erateness in data selection in civil war studies, focusing on the fit between the
question of interest and the concept of civil war that is underlying a given data set.
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Civil wars are large-scale armed conflicts between the government of a sovereign state
and domestic challengers. Empirical analyses of the causes and consequences of civil
war are premised on our ability to clearly define and measure the concept we are trying
to explain, yet scholars classify instances of violent conflict into categories such as civil
wars, coups, riots, genocides, or terrorism based on criteria that are fairly arbitrary. The
term “civil war” is now used interchangeably to refer to conflicts as large as Syria’s
multiyear violence that caused more than 400,000 deaths and displaced about half of the
country’s population as well as any conflict between the state and a domestic armed
group causing twenty-five or more battle deaths in a year (see, e.g., Asal et al. 2016;
Gleditsch et al. 2002).
We highlight two fundamental conceptual questions about how to code civil
wars. First, should civil wars be considered as events that happen to a society in
the aggregate or should they be conceptualized as dyadic conflicts between the state
and an armed group? The current trend in the literature favors the dyadic approach,
which we argue is useful in some contexts, but can also create problems such as
artificially inflating the number of civil wars in a given country while ignoring
interdependencies between these dyadic conflicts. Second, how should acts of armed
conflict in a given country be counted? Should they be combined into a single case
of civil war based on temporal continuity of violence even when there are large gaps
in the fighting? Or should different categories of events be coded when different
forms of violence succeed each other in a process of unfolding conflict with transi-
tions into and out of civil war coded to reflect changes in the organization of
violence? These questions frame an exploration of the implications of different
coding rules for civil war. We demonstrate that coding differences matter for infer-
ences drawn about the causes and consequences of civil war.
Our main argument is that at the core of the concept of civil war is the rupture of
state sovereignty, and therefore, civil war inherently occurs at the level of the polity.
However, that concept is not reflected in studies that adopt an understanding of civil
war as a purely dyadic phenomenon or as a phenomenon defined entirely by technical
criteria such as violence thresholds or periods of inactivity. We explain how to use the
concept of sovereignty rupture to code conflict data that are appropriate for the
analysis of macro-level questions about the onset, duration, termination, or recurrence
of civil war. We use our new data, which cover the years 1945 to 2016, to show
differences in trends of civil war, making comparisons to the most commonly used
database (the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, or ACD). We then replicate
several studies that use ACD data and show that several important results on the
causes or consequences of civil war depend heavily on how civil war is coded.
Conceptual Questions Implicit in the Selection
of Civil War Data
Different lists of civil war reflect different assumptions about the unit of analysis and
the definition of continuing conflict. We highlight two concepts—aggregation and
Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 1543
continuity—that are crucial for the definition and measurement of civil war. Regard-
ing aggregation, we ask whether civil wars take place between specific actors, or if
they are phenomena that acquire meaning only at the level of the political commu-
nity? Regarding continuity, we ask what defines ongoing conflict as opposed to the
end of one civil war and the beginning of a new one?
The Aggregation Question: Actor Dyads or the Polity as the
Locus of Civil War?
First-generation quantitative studies of civil war over the past two decades were
based on cross-country comparisons using aggregate-level data on violence (Fearon
and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Hegre
et al. 2001). In a sharp departure from that approach, second-wave studies use
disaggregated data by studying conflicts between the state and armed groups, or
conflicts in subnational regions.1 That shift can help address a number of important
questions, but increasingly it has also led to a view of conflict as a dyadic phenom-
enon and civil war is now discussed as an event that occurs between the government
and a rebel group (e.g., Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). While disag-
gregating conflict data has clear advantages, there are also costs, which are not well-
understood. Implicit in the new dyadic frameworks is a conceptual shift of war as a
phenomenon that does not affect a country as a whole and is rather circumscribed by
the intensity and type of violence that occurs between the state and individual
challengers. What do we lose by thinking of civil war in that way?
Disaggregation of civil wars into dyadic armed conflicts is appropriate if we want
to explore questions about the organization and behavior of armed actors. By con-
trast, analysis of civil war onset or recurrence is less amenable to such disaggrega-
tion as in most civil wars several actors challenge the state and the emergence of
conflict dyads is endogenous to societal-level political outcomes.2 Disaggregation
can help illuminate a different set of questions, such as why some groups use violent
as opposed to nonviolent tactics to pursue their goals (Sambanis and Zinn 2006;
Cunningham, Dahl, and Fruge 2017). However, the question of why conflict esca-
lates to civil war introduces complex interdependencies between social groups and
conflict actors that cannot be properly accounted for in a purely dyadic framework
unless the model changes accordingly. These interdependencies are usually not
modeled in studies of macrolevel conflict outcomes that are based on dyadic data,
and moreover, the dyadic approach is often applied inconsistently as evidenced by
the fact that the government is always included as a unitary actor in all dyads,
without regard for the fact that governments can be as fragmented as many of the
rebel groups that are coded as distinct actors in dyadic data sets of civil war.3
Macrolevel questions about civil war put the problems of dyadic data into sharp
relief. Projects that investigate the consequence of armed group fragmentation are a
telling example. When we ask a macrolevel question such as what explains war
duration, the dyadic approach can be misleading. The key problem is that the dyads
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themselves are often endogenous to the outcome under study. Assume that we want
to test a theory that factionalism is more likely to occur when groups are not strong
enough to win a decisive victory, due to disagreements about strategy between
moderates and extremists. If wars that do not end in decisive victories last longer,
then there should be more factionalism and more dyads in longer wars. The unit of
analysis is thus endogenous to the dependent variable. There is no easy fix for this
problem and a more theoretically consistent approach would be to analyze war
duration using country-level data in which all dyads that correspond to a single
instance of sovereignty rupture are aggregated up.
The study of the effects of factionalism highlights a second problem related to
aggregation: in some cases, factionalism results in the start of a new conflict that
should be coded as a separate civil war, whereas in other cases, factionalism takes
place within the same instance of sovereignty rupture. In the Philippines, for exam-
ple, a war between the government and Moro guerillas started in 1971 with the rebels
initially represented by the MNLF. Splintering on the rebel side in 1984 led to the
formation of the MILF, which continued to fight after the MNLF signed a settlement
with the government in 1996. We code a single, ongoing war in that case, as our
research suggests that the MNLF and MILF represent a single instance of sover-
eignty rupture. By contrast, the chronologically overlapping war between the gov-
ernment of the Philippines and the NPA represents a separate instance of sovereignty
rupture, which we distinguish as such by coding it as new war starting in 1972 and
ending in 1992 (see Supplemental Material for more details).
An advantage of conceptualizing war as a dyadic phenomenon is that it allows us
to study the effect of policies targeting specific groups. However, the complex
interdependencies that arise from this conceptualization are rarely taken into account
in empirical contexts: if rebellious group A is offered concessions, is it because
another group B is also challenging the state and do the government’s strategies
toward one group affect the other group’s actions, as well as those of a third group C,
that might decide to rebel in the future? These complex interdependencies strain the
assumptions underlying empirical models that are commonly used in studies of civil
war. Fully exploring the implications of these interdependencies is beyond the scope
of this article; to our knowledge, this issue has not been adequately addressed in the
previous literature.
The Continuity Question: Lasting Conflicts or Transitions In and Out of War?
The sovereignty rupture idea suggests a theoretically grounded approach to deal with
the question of what constitutes continuing conflict. Most coding differences across
data sets are due to disagreements over how we distinguish new conflict onsets from
long-lived wars in which violence ebbs and flows, marked by periods of inactivity.
The prevailing practice has been to use a high death threshold to distinguish civil
wars from other forms of conflict, though many studies use the term “civil war”
liberally to refer to minor conflicts with more than twenty-five deaths.4 Uppsala/
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PRIO’s ACD (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002) codes
episodes of conflict that are usually interpreted as civil wars with a new onset coded
each time a conflict causes twenty-five battle deaths as long as there was no conflict
of similar or higher intensity in the previous period.5
Annual fatality thresholds help identify low-level violence and large-scale con-
flict separately. The Correlates of War (COW) Project’s threshold of 1,000-battle
deaths per year was the first instance of this. Many authors use the minimum
threshold of twenty-five battle deaths to classify cases as civil wars. The ACD
provides data on higher-intensity conflicts and most authors using this data set
identify civil wars as those conflicts with “at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a
given year.”
Data on low-level violence are a useful resource that can help researchers
study escalation processes and the ACD is the best available data set for low-
level armed conflict. However, there are problems in separating several periods
of low-level conflict from a civil war that encompasses all those periods and
strict applications of death counts can be misleading. A given conflict can phase
in and out of civil war depending on the yearly death count. In principle, using a
measure of conflict intensity to identify periods of civil war seems reasonable.
Yet, far from capturing a core concept of civil war, this definition can create
fairly arbitrary episodes of conflict.6
In some cases, the political disruption that citizens and researchers alike identify
as civil war may be ongoing during years of low-level conflict when no civil war
would be coded. In other cases, low-level violence that most observers would char-
acterize as residual conflict that takes a different form (e.g., terrorism) can occur
shortly after the end of a civil war. Thus, the application of a strictly numerical
threshold might result in a purely mechanical coding of civil war that is unrelated to
variation in institutional variables of theoretical interest. For example, the most
recent version of the ACD codes some form of conflict in Colombia from 1964
through 2013. But during this period, only 1985, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1999 to 2002,
and 2004 to 2005 are coded as meeting the 1,000-fatality threshold. How should this
case be coded—is it a single civil war, with periods of high- and low-intensity
violence? Or several distinct civil wars with several new onsets?
The sovereignty rupture concept helps us address the continuity question in a
less arbitrary manner than the annual death thresholds. Specifically, consider how
transitions in and out of conflict should be coded in an ideal case where the rebels
win, taking control of the capital. Victory is evidenced by the regime transition and
might or might not be followed by a cessation of hostilities. The new government
almost invariably implements new policies that, in theory, have the potential to
pacify the country. If violence resumes shortly after this transition and the new
regime is opposed by members of the old regime who are now in the opposition, is
this a new war or a continuation of the previous one? Our approach in such cases is
to code a new civil war representing a new instance of sovereignty rupture, as we
explain below.
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Civil War as a Rupture of Sovereignty
We understand sovereignty rupture to mean a challenge to an incumbent govern-
ment’s role as the ultimate arbiter of behavior within a polity.7 Understood in these
terms, the rupture of sovereignty that results from the violent contest between the
governing authority and its opponents constitutes the core feature of civil war.8 The
concept provides a logically consistent framework within which we can delimit the
macrolevel process of civil war, that is, onset, duration, and termination, and resolve
the aggregation and continuity questions.
Sovereignty Rupture and the Aggregation Question
A single rupture of sovereignty often encompasses multiple dyadic conflicts. Break-
ing down a conflict into dyadic relationships necessarily changes the types of ques-
tions we can ask. Specifically, questions such as “what causes ethnic war” when
asked with reference to a country can reasonably be understood as a single instance
of sovereignty rupture. Within the context of a broader conflict, individual dyadic
relationships can rise to the level of conflict intensity that are classified as civil war
but that relationship necessarily depends on the dynamics of the broader conflict.
The form of the incumbent-challenger contest may shift over time—new armed
actors emerge, existing ones unite and fragment, and form alliances and break them.
War is the sum total of these interactions, the continuing struggle between the
incumbent and challengers. While we may observe the balance of power between
the parties to the conflict change over time, the changing fortunes of the combatants
do not define the event of civil war. We are interested in who has won or lost a
particular war rather than who is winning or losing within it. Emphasizing the
rupture of sovereignty therefore allows us to distinguish between events that occur
simply in the process of ongoing war and a period in which war ends with regime
change, but the new government faces armed resistance or insurgency.
The movement to disaggregate conflict data is appealing for many reasons, but if
taken to its logical conclusion can result in treating government-armed organization
dyads as the unit of analysis. A case example illustrates the pitfalls of treating new
dyad formation as equivalent to new war onsets. We code the Second Palestinian
Intifada as a war beginning in September 2000. The practice of coding dyads would
generate separate observations for multiple Palestinian armed political organiza-
tions. The UCDP/PRIO dyadic data set, for example, lists five conflict dyads in
2001, involving Israel on one side, and individually on the other side the Palestinian
National Authority (PNA), Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (UCDP/PRIO dyadic data v17.2). Yet all of
these organizations were active within a single instance of sovereignty rupture.
Indeed, it is methodologically problematic to treat these five dyadic observations
as independent in a statistical analysis. If we were to include them all in a study of
onset, for example, we would in effect be overweighting the impact of any covariates
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that are not disaggregated down to the organization level, and, crucially, any that
capture the behavior of Israel, or characteristics of its government or the country at
the time.
Moreover, the use of dyadic data can produce misleading inferences when the
number of dyads changes over time. In the previous year of the Second Intifada,
2000, the same data set codes two dyads, Israel and the PNA, and Israel and Fatah.
The increase in dyads between 2000 and 2001 might lead a researcher using the
dyadic data to conclude that government- or country-level covariates observed in
2000 are associated with new organizations’ entry into an ongoing conflict. Changes
in the number of dyads, however, may very well result from the process of onset
simply playing out over time as organizations may proceed with military operations
at a deliberate pace.
Dyadic conflicts that collectively represent a single rupture of sovereignty should
be aggregated to a single macrolevel contest as civil war, provided it meets other
coding criteria on which the literature has settled, such as a threshold of violence,
effective resistance, and so on. For many applications, coding civil war around the
concept of sovereignty rupture captures the on-the-ground reality; disaggregation
can be a lens that obscures rather than clarifies.
The question of the correlates of counterinsurgency success provides an example
of the potential pitfalls of disaggregation. During the height of Iraq’s civil war
(2006–2007), at least fifteen major militias were active;9 and observers have counted
scores of distinct armed groups through the war’s various phases.10 Should a dyadic
conflict be coded for each one of these factions?11
For the macrolevel outcome of counterinsurgency success, the dyadic approach
may fall into a trap of overstating the importance of fragmentation. It treats the
formation of a rebel splinter group as equivalent to an entirely new rebel group
entering into the conflict. Research using dyadic data might therefore highlight
certain time-varying factors as linked to counterinsurgency failure based on obser-
vations that include numerous examples of splinter groups as the basis for coding the
onset of conflict. But, a splinter group could be a sign that the government has begun
to turn the tide in the war, with military pressure leading rebel groups to fragment
(e.g., Staniland 2014, 39). The formation of a splinter group need not indicate a
fundamental failure of government attempts to quash a rebellion. Using dyadic data
could therefore lead scholars to mistakenly conclude that certain factors are associ-
ated with failed government attempts to quash rebellions when in fact those same
factors likely point to future counterinsurgency success.
Sovereignty Rupture and the Continuity Question
Viewing civil war as a rupture of sovereignty forces us to recognize shifts in sover-
eignty as a critical component of defining war onset or termination. From the
opposition’s perspective, deposing the sitting government and seizing power elim-
inate the rupture of sovereignty by placing sovereignty in the hands of the
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opposition. A new rupture of sovereignty may occur in short order—in this case,
from the deposed government mounting an ongoing challenge—and continued
fighting between the newly ensconced rulers and the former government should
be understood as a new civil war. Thinking about whether a sovereignty rupture
continues or is resolved changes the way episodes of civil war are coded. Table 1
lists the types of questions that emerge with respect to continuity, the guidance
provided by the sovereignty rupture framework in answering these questions, and
country examples.
Rebel victories illustrate the need to use sovereignty rupture in coding war ter-
mination and new war starts. If rebels win and government changes hands, but
violence continues with no interruption or with only a short interlude with no
fighting, most data sets would code a single episode of civil war. Afghanistan is
such a case, where many data sets code a single ongoing civil war since 1978. This
ignores several regime transitions that occur as a result of rebel victory and collapse
into new violence that represents new instances of sovereignty rupture. From that
perspective, one could code four different civil wars in Afghanistan with new onsets
in 1992, 1996, and 2001 (see Supplemental Material for a detailed discussion). For
studies that consider the relative stability of military victories versus negotiated
settlements, the implications of these coding differences are clear since by combin-
ing all these episodes into a single civil war one would effectively expunge three
cases of rebel victory that fails to establish peace.
A counterargument might be that the decision to code a single war event is driven
mainly by the observation of continuing high levels of violence. But focusing simply
on violence levels misses the point, as illustrated by the example of the Chinese civil
war from 1946 to 1949 and the residual conflict that followed it, from 1949 to 1953.
Although the bulk of the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) military forces were
evacuated from the Chinese Mainland by 1949, some KMT units remained behind,
as did local elites who chose not to flee to Taiwan. Prior to its final evacuation from
the Chinese mainland, the KMT distributed arms to local elites and militias and a
number of its armies in Southern China crossed into Burma and Thailand. From late
1949 to 1953, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) engaged in what it called “the
suppression of bandits and local despots” throughout Southern China.12 This conflict
is distinct from the land reforms and political purges that took place in other areas
under the CCP’s control, which would be classified as politicides.13 According to
our sources (see details in the Supplemental Material), thousands were killed and the
hostilities ended around 1953. This episode was clearly related to the broader Chi-
nese civil war; we code it, however, as a separate period of state consolidation in
which the new government purges pockets of armed opposition in what amounts to a
new civil war.
A different question related to continuity concerns is when to code an end to war
due to inactivity (lack of fighting). Sharp differences in coded onset and termination
of wars arise if annual death thresholds are used strictly to code war termination
versus a more encompassing approach in which cumulative death thresholds are
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used, effectively combining periods of violence into a single conflict even if they are
interrupted by periods of inactivity. In the Supplemental Material, we illustrate this
using data from the ACD, contrasting two different ways Mozambique’s civil war
could be coded. Selecting a high threshold of 1,000 deaths would lead us to code the
war as starting in 1972 ending in 1973, starting again in 1981 and ending in 1991.
Using the cumulative death criterion, the war would be coded as starting six years
earlier (1966), ending in 1974, restarting in 1981, and ending in 1992. The war
would now be coded as restarting in 2013, ending in 2016 because the same party,
RENAMO, was engaged in lower-level armed conflict.
Coding war termination on the basis of violence thresholds is satisfactory from
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prevails since suppressing armed opposition to the point of inactivity eliminates the
rupture of sovereignty. However, rebel victories or settlements represent shifts in
sovereignty. The establishment of a new political order implies that the sovereignty
rupture represented by war has ended. Thus, such events should constitute a basis for
coding war termination rather than strictly adhering to violence thresholds, accord-
ing to which war termination might not occur until years later. The shift in sover-
eignty might not correspond to a reduction in violence (although it usually does).
Chad provides an example of how these coding practices result in substantial
differences between data sets. Coding war termination only with reference to levels
of violence would lead to recording three fewer instances of war termination than
our approach of also noting victories that result in regime transition or with peace
agreements that stop the fighting for a period of six months; our data acknowledge
the rebel victory in 1979, Habre’s capture of the government in 1982, and the
government victory in 1987.
When coding termination due to inactivity, the coding rule underlying the data
influences what questions the data can help us address. If we want to know whether
or not regime transition affects the risk of war recurrence, then coding war termina-
tion on the basis of a death threshold alone would be insufficient. Recognizing the
resolution of the sovereignty rupture reflected in the regime transition implies that
war termination would be coded at the time of rebel victory (or settlement) and such
a coding rule would be better suited for the question at hand. Thus, how we code
termination has obvious implications for studies of war duration or recurrence.14
Table 1 summarizes the main “continuity” issues and presents examples that illus-
trate how differently these cases are treated in the leading data set as compared to our
own coding based on the concept of sovereignty rupture.
An intuitive and influential argument contends that military victory is more likely
than other forms of civil war settlement to lead to a stable, lasting peace.15 But to
study postconflict peacebuilding requires civil war coding rules that properly
address the continuity question.
Consider the difference between applying a yearly death threshold versus our
coding criteria for conflict termination to the case of Somalia between 2006 and
2007. According to the ACD, there were at least twenty-five battled-related deaths in
2006 and at least 1,000 in 2007. A twenty-five yearly deaths threshold would
therefore result in coding ongoing war for this entire period.
These two years, though, were ones of anything but continuity in the Somali
polity. Between February and June 2006, the emerging Islamic Courts Union
successfully consolidated territorial control against the alliance of groups that
had controlled the capital of Mogadishu. Next, from June through December, the
ICU government faced strong resistance from the forces of the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG), which was backed by Ethiopian troops. The
TFG-Ethiopian forces defeated the ICU in December, but by the end of January
2007 were battling an insurgency against their newly established rule (Menkhaus
2007, 374, 380-82, 385-86).
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Our coding rules clarify that these transitions in government represent end points
for what had been ongoing wars. We code three distinct wars during the period in
question, one of which continued after 2007, while the use of a strict yearly death
threshold criterion would lead to coding ongoing war in Somalia from before 2006
through 2007 and beyond. Our approach recognizes two victories during 2006,
neither of which produces postconflict peace, while a strict yearly death threshold
approach is more likely by design to generate data that associate victory with post-
conflict peace because it only classifies events that are not followed by additional
fighting as victories.
Coding Multiple, Temporally Overlapping Wars in One Country
Identifying distinct civil wars in a single country during a given time period is
appropriate if these constitute separable instances of sovereignty rupture. A chal-
lenge to a government’s sovereignty has two dimensions—political stakes and stra-
tegic coordination. In center-seeking rebellions, this rupture is total; the challengers
dispute the sitting government’s claim to rule, over the complete territorial extent of
the polity. Thus, if several groups arise in a revolutionary civil war, each aiming to
capture the state, we would code a single war by virtue of the single, overarching
rupture of sovereignty in the country. In contrast, the rupture of sovereignty in a
secessionist war is partial: while a secessionist group seeks to entirely displace the
sitting government in a region of the country, its claims do not necessarily extend to
the government’s sovereignty over the rest of the polity, and often, the violence can
be geographically confined. In such cases, more than a single war can be coded in the
country if the state faces two unrelated separatist movements.
The extent to which challengers coordinate political and military strategies
should also be reflected in coding decisions. The closer the direct or indirect coor-
dination between armed groups, the stronger the evidence that the war represents a
single sovereignty rupture. We illustrate this with an example from Myanmar’s
political conflicts. Table 2 summarizes the use of sovereignty rupture to distinguish
multiple, chronologically overlapping wars for the Myanmar example that follows,
and the additional example of Ethiopia between the mid-1970s and 1990.
Myanmar (Burma) is infamous for having experienced “the world’s longest-
running civil war” (Economist 2013). Violent conflict erupted immediately fol-
lowing independence in 1948, and a communist insurgency was quickly followed
by a series of rebellions by ethnic minority groups (Smith 2002). More than thirty
separate armed groups fought against the state at different times (Smith 1999,
2002; Human Rights Watch 2002). The government managed to end the commu-
nist insurgency in 1988, but could not quell the ethnic rebellions until 1998,
through a series of cease-fires with the major groups. Low-level violence has
continued through the present.
Our concept of sovereignty rupture leads us to code the first round of ethnic
rebellions (1948–1951) as a single war distinct from the communist insurgency
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(1948–1988), followed by a subsequent round of ethnic rebellions as a third war.
The communist insurgency and ethnic rebellions had fundamental differences in
the political stakes (the Burma Communist Party [BCP] wanted to replace the
existing central government, while the ethnic rebellions pushed for secession,
autonomy, or a new federal structure). As Silverstein (1990, 120) summarizes,
“Unlike the minorities, the BCP wanted a united and centrally controlled Burma,
not an ethnically divided federal union.” Therefore, even a period of tactical
coordination between the BCP and ethnic armed groups in the late 1980s did not
represent a shift in the nature of the war. The links between the different ethnic
rebellions are less straightforward than is the difference between them and the
communist insurgency.
During the second war, a series of alliances brought together multiple minority
groups. One of the more successful efforts at a formal alliance between the mino-
rities came in 1976 when The National Democratic Front was formed by armed
groups representing eight of the ethnic minorities—the Arakanese, Kachin, Karen,
Karenni, Lahu, Palaung, Shan, and Pa-O. It grew and later expanded to also include
the Wa, Mon, and Chin (Silverstein 1990). The NDF existed to unify the efforts of all
anti-government forces and included a mutual defense provision. This codified the
complementarities between the rebellions by the many armed groups, and when
viewed from the perspective of the Burmese government, the ethnic rebel groups
Table 2. Sovereignty Rupture as the Basis for Coding Multiple Civil Wars in a Single Country
During a Given Time Period—Examples.
Country
Example Sovereignty Rupture Guidance Coding Result
Myanmar,
1948–1995
Code separate war for the ethnic rebellions
and the communist insurgency due to
distinctive political stakes
Code a single war encompassing multiple








Code separate Eritrean secessionist and
Ogden irredentist wars due to distinctive
political stakes. Distinctive stakes mean
that coordination between Eritrean and
Tigrean groups is an insufficient basis upon
which to aggregate Eritrean secessionist
war and center-seeking rebellion
Combine center-seeking rebellions into one







Note: See Supplemental Material for descriptions of the Ethiopia cases and coding decisions.
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represented a single threat to the territorial integrity of the state. This is reflected in
the government’s strategy for ending the conflict: it offered cease-fires and auton-
omy deals to all ethnic groups and by getting some to enter into these agreements, it
reduced the armed threat posed by the remaining groups. Thus, our sovereignty
rupture concept leads us to combine these conflicts into a single one as opposed
to coding up to thirty separate conflict dyads.
New Data on Civil Wars
We now apply our insights about the coding of civil war to extend and slightly revise
the data set created by Sambanis (2004). The revisions are designed to improve the
consistency of the coding with the concept of sovereignty rupture. Our data set
covers the 1945 to 2016 period. All coding decisions are explained in detail in
Coding Notes available online, and the Supplemental Material provides a list of
cases that have been recoded.16
Mapping trends in the onset of civil war is a useful starting point. We explore
these for our data in Figure 1, in which we also plot wars as coded by Uppsala/
PRIO’s ACD. Although the incidence of civil wars was declining since the end
of the Cold War, we observe a sharp rise in the past decade. The uptick in the
number of wars in the last decade is due to a resurgence of ethno-sectarian
conflicts that challenge Gurr’s (2000) early predictions of the decline of ethnic
war. There is overall a declining linear trend of war incidence in our data since
1990 (Figure 1, triangles/red line), while the trend is flat in the ACD (using the
cumulative death criterion; left panel). The differences are smaller if we fit a
quadratic trend line (Figure 2), though the lines intersect if we use the annual
death threshold. There is also a noticeable and growing gap after year 2006,
which we believe is a consequence of the coding approach taken by the ACD
and, specifically, how they code conflicts involving the Islamic State.17 Using
the annual conflict intensity ACD coding (right panels in Figures 1 and 2), the
trend lines appear more similar, though there is a large gap in the number of
wars coded in the ACD and our data with significantly fewer country-years of
war coded in the ACD.
Comparing war onsets between our data and ACD, we see broadly similar
negative trends since 1990 in the second panel of Figure 1 (using the annual
1,000 death threshold for ACD conflicts). Figure 2 shows that the divergences in
the trend lines in our data compared to ACD grow depending on whether we use
the ACD 25-battle deaths criterion or the 1,000-battle deaths criterion, which is
to be expected given the preceding discussion. The uptick in war onsets since
the early 2000s might constitute a distinct set of cases of civil war as several of
these conflicts are the outgrowth of the US invasion of the Iraq invasion in 2003
and of regime instability associated with the Arab Spring uprisings beginning in
2011. Figures S3.1 to S3.4 in the supplement present this information in more
detail, comparing trends in our data and ACD data using the 1,000-fatality



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































threshold (Figures S3.1 and S3.2) and the annual fatality threshold for 25 annual
deaths (Figure S3.3) and 1,000 deaths (Figure S3.4).
Replications of Studies Using Civil War as an Explanatory
Variable—Focusing on Continuity
Next, we use our data to revisit important substantive questions for which the
incidence of civil war is a potentially crucial explanatory variable. Specifically,
we replicate three studies and examine how the effect of using our data on their
results: Graham, Miller, and Strøm’s (2017) article on the effects of powersharing on
democratic survival; Lai and Thyne’s (2007) article on the effect of civil war on
education; and Colgan’s (2015) article on oil dependence, domestic-armed conflict,
and democratization. For each study, our expectation is that the conceptual questions
related to continuity that we addressed earlier are likely to have important ramifica-
tions for these analyses. To conserve space, we summarize the main research ques-
tion and empirical results, followed by a brief discussion of each analysis.
Graham, Miller, and Strøm (2017) analyze the effects of three types of power-
sharing agreements—constraining, dispersive, and inclusive—on democratic sur-
vival. They find that only “constraining” powersharing has consistently positive
effects and that, in the subset of countries that have experienced civil war, inclusive
powersharing after war also promotes democratic survival, whereas dispersive
powersharing does not. They define postconflict countries as those that have expe-
rienced a conflict that has caused at least 1,000 cumulative deaths according to the
UCDP/PRIO data set. We replicate the analysis from Table 4, in their article focus-
ing on the interaction of the postconflict indicator with each type of powersharing
institution. We then replace their postconflict indicator with one coded in an iden-
tical manner but using our civil war data. Results are shown in Table 3. There is a
marked change in the estimated effect of dispersive powersharing using our data: it
goes from negative to positive and significant using the three model specifications in
their main analysis. Using our data, the magnitude of the effect of inclusive power-
sharing changes substantially, and the effect of constraining powersharing attenuates
and is not statistically significant in model 3. Thus, the results of this study are not
robust to an alternative coding of civil war.
Lai and Thyne (2007) argue that civil wars should reduce education expenditures
and school enrollments by destroying infrastructure and shifting expenditures from
human capital development to military capacity. Using data from COW and the
ACD, they show that civil war has a significant negative impact on school expen-
ditures and enrollment but find no evidence that it leads to the reallocation of
educational funds toward the military. They also find that civil war continues to
exert a negative impact on educational outcomes into the postconflict period. Their
civil war variables are binary indicators for country-years in which either COW or
the ACD codes an ongoing intrastate conflict. COW codes civil war for all country-
years in which a conflict caused 1,000 battle deaths. Lai and Thyne use a comparable








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































civil war variable from the ACD, one that codes civil war for all country-years in
which a conflict caused 1,000 battle deaths, but with one key difference from
COW—they count only wars classified by UCDP/PRIO as “internal wars.” This
choice excludes a number of civil wars that UCDP/PRIO classifies as
“internationalized,” yet there is no reason to do so given the conceptualization of
civil war in their study. They also use two variables that code all country-years that
follow a civil war, one corresponding to the COW civil war variable, the other to the
UCDP/PRIO civil war variable.
Replicating their analysis after replacing these indicators with identically coded
ones based on our data makes us more sanguine about the negative effects of civil
wars on education. Results are shown in Table 4. Where Lai and Thyne find signif-
icant negative effects of civil war, our reanalysis always yields insignificant results.
In addition, the effect of postconflict periods is either negative or null in the original
article; using our data, we find that postcivil war periods actually see statistically
significant increases in educational spending and enrollment.18
The studies replicated above used the ACD war list based on a cumulative death
threshold or a 1,000 yearly death threshold but with the exclusion of internationa-
lized conflicts. As we showed earlier with respect to trends in onset, the differences
between our data and the ACD are smaller when the annual death threshold is used
and internationalized conflicts are included, so we chose to replicate a study that
meets these criteria: Colgan (2015). Colgan asks an interesting question: why are
petro-states more prone to civil war while also being autocratic if civil wars create
opportunities for regime transitions? He finds that civil war has a significant positive
impact on the likelihood of autocratic regime transitions, but that oil income has no
additional effect on the likelihood of regime transitions during civil conflict periods.
Results using our data are very similar to Colgan’s. As shown in Table 5, there are
some differences in magnitude, but the sign and significance of estimated coeffi-
cients for the key explanatory variables are substantively the same. This is partly due
to the fact that the key variable—the designation of a country as a petro-state—does
not vary significantly over time, so results are less sensitive to differences in the
coded timing of civil war onset. These results are also consistent with our earlier
observation that the cumulative death criterion maximizes differences with other
data sets. We conclude that the ACD’s annual death threshold is preferable to its
cumulative intensity coding, with the important qualification that researchers should
not limit themselves to ACD’s list of internal wars but instead also include inter-
nationalized civil wars.
Replications of Studies Using Civil War as a Dependent Variable—
Continuity and Aggregation
The differences observed in Figures 1 and 2 comparing coded war onsets in our data
versus in the ACD could affect the substantive conclusions of studies of war onset
1562 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(6)
depending on which data set is used. We explore this further by replicating three
studies where civil war onset is the dependent variable.
Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014) test hypotheses about the effect of
ethnic economic and political inequality on the risk of civil war at the country level.
They use new empirical measures of inequality that significantly improve on pre-
vious studies. They correlate these measures with a binary civil war variable based
on the ACD, coded 1 the first year a conflict between the state and a domestic rival
causes twenty-five deaths or more, and zero otherwise. A new onset is coded every
time deaths rise to this level if in the preceding two years violence levels were lower.
They also use Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) coding of civil war as an alternative
dependent variable to check the robustness of their results.
In Table 6, we replicate results shown in Tables 1 and 4 of their article and we
also show results for the same models using our data to code civil war onset. We find
that their results for horizontal economic inequality, the size of the largest group that
is discriminated against, and groups’ loss of political status (all positively associated
with civil war onset) are robust to changes in the coding of civil war. This is probably
because they aggregate dyadic conflict data to the country level (consistent with our
recommendation) and also because their inequality measures are fairly constant over
time, hence less sensitive to changes in the start and end dates of war. We do
nonetheless find some intriguing differences with respect to the effect of power-
sharing on conflict onset. While Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch find no effect
using either the ACD or Fearon and Laitin data, using our data we find that ethnic
executive powersharing significantly increases the likelihood of war onset. The
effect of ELF, which is positive using ACD data, also disappears using our data
(or the Fearon and Laitin data).19
Koubi and Böhmelt (2014) revisit the debate on “greed versus grievance” in civil
war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and argue that there is an interactive effect of low
per capita GDP and ethnic political exclusion, such that war onset is more likely in
richer countries with excluded ethnic groups. Civil war onsets from 1951 to 2005 are
analyzed with the country-year as the unit of observation. In Table 7, we present
results from a number of their models using the original specification, followed by
estimates using our data on civil war onset. We find that the key explanatory vari-
able—the interaction between GDP and exclusion—is no longer statistically signif-
icant using our data; and there is also no significant effect for several other key
explanatory variables (share of excluded groups, ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
and oil).
Basedau, Pfeiffer, and Vüllers (2016) test the effect of religious discrimination
and religious calls for violence (using originally coded data on these variables) on
civil war onset for 1990 to 2010, relying on the ACD as their source of data on wars.
The unit of observation is the country-year, but onset appears to be coded based on
ACD conflict ids, with new onset coded each year in which there are twenty-five
battle-related deaths for a given ACD conflict id provided that conflict id experi-
enced no conflict in the previous year.20












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Using their preferred list of civil war onsets, the authors find that religious
fractionalization, polarization, dominance, and whether religious identities coincide
“at least partially” with other identity categories (ethnic, regional, or economic) are
all statistically significant COW onset. All of these results disappear if we use our
civil war onset data to replace their conflict onset measure (see Table 8). The study
also reports no significant effect of religious grievances over discrimination if all
types of conflict are considered (model 7) but does find religious discrimination to
be a significant correlate of interreligious or theological conflict. The authors point
to these results as motivation for distinguishing between conflict types. However,
using our data, we find that there is, in fact, a significant positive effect of religious
grievances for armed conflict generally (model 7). Religious grievances are more
significant than the authors initially thought, but the data may not support the notion
that the effect of religious grievances varies according to the type of conflict that the
authors identify. Finally, the country’s dependence on oil exports, which is signif-
icant and positive in their data, is no longer significant using our data.
To sum up, we have replicated several influential studies of civil war and found
that their results frequently depend on how civil war is coded. Many of these studies
are exemplary in presenting new data on important correlates of violent conflict. But
they do not justify their choice of data on civil war and they fail to consider whether
this matters. This is hardly a lacuna; the authors’ substantive conclusions are in some
cases annulled, in others reversed entirely, when we code civil war consistent with
its widely accepted core trait—sovereignty rupture. And, as summarized in Table 8,
these studies’ descriptions of civil war and its potential effects correspond to the
sovereignty rupture concept that our coding criteria capture.
Conclusion: The Intertwined Nature of Theory, Data
Selection, and Coding Rules
The inferences we make about the causes and consequences of civil war are based on
the analysis of quantitative data that often differ greatly across data sets. Key
concepts—such as civil war, victory, or powersharing—are often understood and
measured differently across cases. This pluralism is not inherently bad, but it makes
it difficult to produce cumulative knowledge: analyses produce wildly different
conclusions depending on which data are used.
The first sensitivity analysis of empirical results on internal armed conflict
(Hegre and Sambanis 2006) showed that there are important differences in the
correlates of civil war as compared to minor armed conflicts. Since then, rather than
see researchers drawing more careful distinctions between wars and lower-level
conflict, we have seen the opposite. Using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data-
base, which codes annual levels of battle deaths, researchers increasingly refer to
any conflict that causes twenty-five battle deaths per year as a civil war.21 And,
studies increasingly disaggregate state–group interactions over time and use data
1568 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(6)
from lower-level armed conflicts to test theories about the causes and consequences
of civil war.
This article argues that civil war is characterized by the concept of sovereignty
rupture, and as such, it affects an entire polity. We have provided new data that are
coded consistent with this concept of civil war and compared our data to the UCDP/
PRIO list of civil wars, which is the most widely used source in the literature.
Reviewing several studies and replicating their analyses reveals that researchers
often use off-the-shelf measures that they assume capture civil war without carefully
considering whether the coding of the data corresponds to this theoretical concept
given the question being studied.
To improve this situation, we suggest that all studies justify their selection of war
data in a clear, transparent manner. If a twenty-five death threshold is used to code
war onset, why is this is a reasonable decision given the question being addressed? If
a cumulative threshold is preferred over an annual death threshold, why does this
better capture the phenomenon of civil war as understood in the underlying theory?
If a war is broken down into several dyadic conflicts, why is this appropriate given
the nature of these conflicts and the interdependencies among them?
Our data should serve as an alternative source to check the robustness of empiri-
cal findings in studies of civil war. Key substantive conclusions of published articles
should not depend on seemingly small differences in the technical criteria used to
code conflict episodes. Selecting a number of studies at random to replicate, we
found stark differences in the conclusions that these studies can support when we use
our data instead of the authors’ preferred operationalization of civil war (summar-
ized in Table 9). These studies’ empirical results on the effects of powersharing,
education, religious fragmentation, oil dependence, or other variables that we have
explored in our replication analysis could have been the basis for developing policy
prescriptions for conflict management. Such results should therefore not depend on
small differences in the coding of civil war; or if they do, researchers should be
transparent about these differences and justify their selection of data.
Our data set, coding conflicts from 1945 to 2016, has the advantage of being
based on a detailed coding rule and it is supported by more than 500 pages of coding
notes. The data set improves on competing sources by being less reliant on an overly
strict application of the fatalities threshold in identifying distinct episodes of con-
flict; and it explains which dyadic conflicts should be aggregated up into a single
instance of sovereignty rupture and which should be separated into new wars. The
key here is that disaggregation should reflect sovereignty rupture, not the endogen-
ous creation of actors involved in conflict.
Careful matching of data to the research question at hand is particularly impor-
tant for studies that focus on war duration and recurrence as well as any study of
the effects of civil war. Errors in the coding of war onset or termination will
introduce significant bias in those studies, as evidenced by the replication results
we have presented.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Moreover, forecasting future civil wars will similarly likely be extremely sen-
sitive to the list of civil war used. If an arbitrarily high (or low) number of war
onsets if coded based on a strict application of a fatalities threshold, then the
training set that will be used to calibrate a forecasting model will generate very
different out-of-sample predictions as compared to a model calibrated on a differ-
ently coded set of wars.
Over the past two-and-half decades, social scientific research on civil war has
become a vibrant field. Quantitative studies have played an important role in its
development. Increasingly, scholars employ microlevel research designs, but macro-
level studies of the causes and consequences of civil war have been important not
only in their own right but also in how they inform our theories about human
choices during conflict. An important step in the field’s maturation has been the
recognition of the limitations inherent to all of the research methods and designs
available to scholars; thus the importance of pluralism. But progress must not be
impeded by facets of research that are within our control—the careful selection
and use of data. Careful matching of data to theory will help quantitative,
macrolevel research on civil war to achieve its potential—the cumulative pro-
duction of knowledge.
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Notes
1. Cederman and Gleditsch (2009) discuss the move toward disaggregation; and Cederman
and Vogt (2017) discuss civil war trends drawing on the logic of civil war as a
dyadic conflict.
1572 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(6)
2. Who are the relevant “challengers” or “actors” is another question that is often left
unaddressed in the literature. Should units of analysis be ethnic groups, rebel groups,
political movements, or parties? This question becomes relevant in disaggregated studies.
3. The Peruvian insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s is a good example. The Peruvian
Communist Party, commonly known as the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL), began
anti-government activity immediately before the 1980 presidential election. SL fought
the government, as did the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revo-
lucionario Túpac Amaru, MRTA). The dyadic version of the ACD codes two conflicts—
the state versus SL; and the state versus the MRTA. But there were also multiple actors
fighting the rebels: the Peruvian Army, Marines, regular police forces, special counter-
guerrilla police, civil defense groups, and even right-wing vigilante groups. Many of
these groups maintained significant autonomy, so we could identify multiple anti-rebel
actors. Yet the government is assumed to be a single actor (see the supplement for more
discussion of this case). An important contribution that could help address this issue is
Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe’s (2013) data set on state-backed militias.
4. This is typically done by researchers using the ACD (see, e.g., Cederman et al. 2015;
Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2014). Published articles are rarely
clear about the distinction between any armed conflict and civil war, though Hegre and
Sambanis (2006) in the first sensitivity analysis of empirical results in this literature
established that there are significant differences between the correlates of civil war,
understood as large-scale armed conflict, and minor armed conflict (twenty-five battle
deaths criterion).
5. The data set allows researchers to choose the number of years of violence below the
twenty-five deaths threshold that are required to code a new onset. These intervals vary
widely from one year (Basedau, Pfeiffer, and Vüllers 2016) or two (Cederman et al. 2015)
to nine (Koubi and Böhmelt 2014). There is usually no theoretical justification for
selecting an interval of specific length, though longer ones are clearly more consistent
with the idea of a new onset.
6. For this reason, authors like Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Sambanis (2004) set a casualty
threshold for the course of the entire war and a less strict one for a yearlong (Fearon and
Laitin) or multiyear period (Sambanis).
7. Here, we follow Krasner’s (1988) definition of sovereignty of “the assertion of final
authority within a given territory” (p. 86). This also corresponds to the concept of
“empirical statehood” (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Jackson 1990, 21). See also Krasner’s
(1999, 4) definition of “domestic sovereignty”: “the formal organization of political
authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control
within the borders of their own polity.”
8. Indeed, sovereignty rupture anchors nearly all social scientific definitions of civil war.
See, for example, Licklider (1993) and the discussion in Eckstein (1965) and Rosenau
(1964), although the latter two authors prefer the term “internal war.” Across a wide
swathe of history, diverse civilizations have understood civil war similarly (e.g., the
concept of stasis in ancient Greece, the Roman concept of bellum civile, and harb ahliyya
in Arabic; see also Armitage 2017).
Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 1573
9. The Mapping Militant Organizations project at Stanford University (Crenshaw 2015) lists
the following groups as active from 2006 to 2007: Hamas Iraq, 1920s Revolutionary
Brigades, Mujahideen Army, Islamic Army in Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna, Ansar al-Islam, al-
Qaeda in Iraq, Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Nashqabandi, Fatah al-Islam, Kataib Hezbollah,
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq, Promised Day Brigades, the Mahdi Army, the militia of the Supreme
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and the Badr Brigade (militia of the Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq).
10. Ridolfo (2004), for example, lists twenty-seven armed groups. International Crisis Group
(2006) listed thirteen insurgent groups (not taking into account Shia militias), and “As of
mid-December 2005,” had catalogued “some 50 different brigades claiming military
deeds under the banner of one major group or the other” (ICG 2006, 1). See also descrip-
tions in Human Rights Watch (2005).
11. The ACD codes four factions on the anti-government side in the Iraqi civil war: Al-Mahdi
Army, Ansar al-Islam, ISI, and RJF. RJF is actually a coalition of three groups: the
Islamic Army in Iraq, the Mujahideen Army, and Ansar al-Sunna.
12. See Du Runsheng (1996, 309-13) and Luo Pinghan (2005, 304-18).
13. Dikötter (2013) details these campaigns. He estimates deaths resulting from them at five
million (see p. xiii).
14. For example, in Laos, we code three wars, but if we did not use victories or settlements to
mark the end of a war and the start of a new one, we would instead code a single war from
1960 to 1979. In Chad, this coding rule leads us to code six episodes of war since the
country’s independence in 1965. By contrast, Fearon and Laitin code 2 wars through 1999
versus five in our data, and the ACD codes 1 through 2016 (v17.2; ACD codes a second
conflict in 2015 involving the Islamic State, but it does not reach the 1,000 death thresh-
old and is coded as ending in that year).
15. See, for example, Luttwak (1999) and Toft (2010).
16. We revise eighteen observations from Sambanis (2004). This includes cases of wars that
are split into multiple wars, one case that is eliminated, and several cases with slightly
recoded dates (month or year of onset). We also add six new wars: the potentially
ambiguous Oromo and Ogaden wars in Ethiopia starting in the late 1990s; and Chad
1998 to 2003, China 1949 to 1953, Laos 1976 to 1979, and Romania 1989.
17. As mentioned in Table 1, ACD codes new conflicts over new incompatibilities in all
countries where IS is active, leading them to code several new war onsets from 2014 to
2016. However, there is a clear “lineage” between IS and groups that were previously
active in the same countries (e.g., AQIM and IS in Algeria) and the same basis for
sovereignty rupture—a contest over the state—so by our rules, these conflicts should
be considered a single incidence of sovereignty rupture. See Supplemental Material for a
more detailed discussion of coding conflicts that involve IS.
18. In our Table 4, columns 5 and 7, we report a replication of their results using ACD in
which we substitute their original postwar dummy variable for the dynamic one used in
Table II of their article. This yields a statistically significant increase in enrollment, but
not spending. Using the SSW Data, we find consistent results—a statistically significant
increase across enrollment and spending.
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19. In sensitivity tests reported in their article, Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014) note
this change in the effect of ELF when data from Fearon and Laitin are used (p. 428).
20. Angola is an instructive example to illustrate how these coding rules operate. Basedau,
Pfeiffer, and Vüllers code new conflict onsets in 1991, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2004,
2007, and 2009. The ACD (v17.2) lists an ongoing conflict between the government and
UNITA from before 1990 through 1995. The new onsets up until 1996 are the result of the
Cabinda conflict rising above and falling below the twenty-five battle-death threshold.
The new onset in 1998 is due to renewed conflict between UNITA and the government
starting in that year, the new onset in 2002 is due to a resumption of the Cabinda conflict
despite ongoing conflict between the government and UNITA, and the new onsets in
2004, 2007, and 2009 are due to the Cabinda conflict against rising above and falling
below the twenty-five battle-death threshold.
21. For example, of the fourteen studies of civil war and armed conflict published by the
Journal of Conflict Resolution between January 1 and August 2, 2018 that used cross-
country data analysis (includes publication via “online first,” excludes articles the pri-
mary function of which was to present a new data set), ten used a twenty-five yearly
battle-related death threshold (or lower) and four used the UCDP/PRIO ACD or a data set
built on it but did not explain their criteria for what constituted a civil war. The former are
Gleditsch et al. (2018), Fisk (2018), Bohnet, Cottier, and Hug (2018), Prorok (2018), Otto
(2018), Conrad et al. (2019), Maekawa (2019), Wiegand and Keels (2019), Asal et al.
(2018), and Kim and Hong (2019). The latter are Blankenship (2018), Kim (2018), Lee
(2018), and Roy (2018).
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